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Emotions are a near-universal component
of human experience, with powerful influ-
ences on human attitudes and behaviors,
and large-scale social, economic, and envi-
ronmental consequences (Zajonc, 1984;
Oatley et al., 2006; Turner and Stets, 2006;
Nesse and Ellsworth, 2009; Niedenthal
and Brauer, 2012; Dehaene, 2014). They
have been described as a continuum that
includes over 100 named emotions, with
some individual and cultural differences
(Johnson-Laird and Oatley, 1989; Nesse
and Ellsworth, 2009; Izard, 2010). These
are sometimes treated as combinations
of basic emotions (Ortony and Turner,
1990), recognizable through facial expres-
sions (Ekman, 1982; Dannlowski et al.,
2007; Graham and LaBar, 2012).
The neurophysiological and biochem-
ical mechanisms and effects of human
emotions have been analyzed intensively
(LeDoux, 2000; Ackerl et al., 2002; Chen
et al., 2006; Mujica-Parodi et al., 2009;
Zhou and Chen, 2009; Haegler et al., 2010;
Van Westerloo et al., 2011; Agren et al.,
2012; Gross and Canteras, 2012; Avila and
Lin, 2014; Dehaene, 2014). All such mea-
sures, however, rely on research subjects
also communicating their self-perceived
emotions to the researcher. Similarly,
for analyses of psychological experiences
rather than biochemical or neurologi-
cal mechanisms, research subjects must
express their emotional experiences
in words and communicate them to
researchers. The latter also use language
to communicate their analyses to research
readers. They may include selected
quotations directly from the research
subjects. Comprehension of such com-
munications about emotions depends on
mutual recognition of similar emotional
experiences.
This approach breaks down, however,
for emotions that are not widely expe-
rienced, and which are considered to be
indescribable by those who have indeed
experienced them. The popular literatures
of ecstatic religions, active military com-
bat, and extreme outdoor sports all argue
that there are feelings that are only com-
prehensible to individuals who have expe-
rienced them in person (Caputo, 1977;
Allman et al., 2009; Buckley, 2012; Yogis,
2013). These experiences include the per-
ception of slowed time (Arstila, 2012;
Wittmann, 2013; Buckley, 2014).
Human societies thus include a small
number of individuals who have experi-
enced emotions of a type or intensity that
fall outside the distributional range for the
remainder of the population. These differ-
ences are recognized by the rest of soci-
ety, which may label those individuals as
eccentric, sick or crazy, with either posi-
tive or negative connotations. For at least
some individuals, these emotional expe-
riences drive them to take actions that
are considered unusual or extreme, also
in either a negative or positive way. There
are extensive literatures on the psycholo-
gies of crime, combat, mental illness, spir-
ituality and extreme sport, reflecting the
importance of these emotions and actions
to human societies (Lyng, 1990; Buckley,
2012).
These literatures include ethnographic
analyses, where the researcher aims to
become assimilated into the group under
study. Even with full-immersion ethnogra-
phy, however (Hammersley and Atkinson,
2007; Dauphinee, 2010), verbal commu-
nication between research subject and
research analyst remains critical. The
insider approach aims partly to provide
a shared basis for understanding, but
principally to establish trust between sub-
jects and researcher, so that the research
subjects will tell the researcher infor-
mation that they do not share with
outsiders. Even insider ethnographies,
therefore, cannot be used to analyse expe-
riences which research subjects cannot put
into words. If a research subject cannot
communicate their emotional experiences
to a researcher, there is no opportu-
nity for analysis unless the researcher can
directly experience those same emotions
themselves.
For emotional experiences of this type,
therefore, the only research approach cur-
rently available is analytical autoethnogra-
phy, the systematic study of a researcher’s
own experience (Buzard, 2003; Anderson,
2006; Dauphinee, 2010; Tolich, 2010).
Researchers who have themselves under-
gone such experiences have an oppor-
tunity to describe, analyse and report
them by using themselves as research
subjects. Extreme emotional experiences
are infrequent, and most are involuntary
(Berntsen, 2009), so data are sparse. In
the particular case of extreme sports or
adventure activities, however, a researcher
who is also a practitioner can adopt an
experimental approach to autoethnogra-
phy. That is, they can deliberately repeat an
experience which creates powerful emo-
tions, specifically to study those emotions.
Analytical autoethnography may thus
be seen simply as an extension or spe-
cial case of conventional ethnography. In
any ethnographic study, there is a trade-
off between breadth and depth, the num-
ber of research subjects against the detail
they reveal. Analytical autoethnography is
the logical continuation, narrowest but
deepest. Researchers can examine their
own emotions in finer detail than those
www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 209 | 1
Buckley Autoethnography helps analyse emotions
of research subjects. Using a retrospec-
tive approach, they can replay past expe-
riences repeatedly from memory. Using
a prospective or experimental approach,
they can deliberately replicate particu-
lar experiences to analyse the associated
emotions.
The practical methodology for ret-
rospective analytical autoethnography of
intense human emotional experiences is
the same as for conventional ethnogra-
phy (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007).
In each case, data are derived from
detailed recollections (Berntsen, 2009;
Rubin, 2014) of brief, infrequent but criti-
cal (Flanagan, 1954) lifetime events. These
events are fixed firmly in memory pre-
cisely because of the intensity of associ-
ated emotions (Levine and Pizarro, 2004;
Rubin, 2014). The research focus is on self-
perceived emotional experiences as they
exist in the subject’s memory. These rec-
ollections thus provide precisely the data
required.
Some examples of such data are pro-
vided by Buckley (2012). Other examples,
from the author’s own autoethnographic
experience, include the details of thrill,
joy, triumph, fear, relief, anger and sadness
experienced during events such as nar-
rowly escaping death, seeing friends die,
commencing difficult maneuvres during
outdoor adventure sports, and either com-
pleting such maneuvres successfully, or
failing but surviving. Most of these critical
events occurred during adventure recre-
ation activities. Other researchers have
described their own experiences in very
different circumstances, such as combat,
religion or medicine.
In recalling intense emotional expe-
riences, analytical autoethnographers can
use three measures of intensity. In some
cases, intense emotions triggered involun-
tary actions or vocalizations at the time
they were experienced, and these can be
recalled later. Examples include gasps of
awe or yells of triumph (Buckley, 2012).
In other cases, the recollection includes
particularly fine and intense details of sen-
sory perceptions unrelated to the emotion
itself. In other cases again, the recollec-
tion generates an involuntary physiologi-
cal response, even if the actual event was
decades early (Mattley, 2002; Levine and
Pizarro, 2004). An example is a cold sweat
on recalling a narrow escape (Buckley,
2012). In the experimental approach, an
autoethnographer can learn through prac-
tice to examine the fine-scale tempo-
ral sequences of actions and emotions,
at a resolution rarely available through
retrospective evaluation of involuntary
experiences.
As with all forms of ethnography,
triangulation is a critical component,
to provide reliability and confidence in
individual recollections. Readers of any
ethnographic research rely on research
subjects to report their experiences reliably
and accurately to the ethnographers, and
ethnographers to select and report their
subjects’ statements accurately to read-
ers. Both analyst and readers triangulate
information from individual research sub-
jects against other relevant sources, to test
reliability. Neither have direct access to
the subjects’ own emotional experiences.
The same applies to autoethnographies.
As in all forms of research, research read-
ers rely on researchers’ abilities to make
accurate and undeluded observations. If a
researcher is able to undergo and describe
an experience reported by others as real
but indescribable, then their descriptions
can be triangulated against ethnogra-
phies and autobiographies, adding reli-
ably to understanding of intense human
emotions.
Historically, it appears that there has
been a substantial bias against analytical
autoethnography in many social sciences.
This, however, appears to be unjusti-
fied. Autoethnographic observations have
the advantage of being first-hand, unlike
the second-hand reports from conven-
tional ethnographies. The natural sci-
ences routinely rely on first-hand rather
than second-hand observations. A num-
ber of famous scientific discoveries have
been made by researchers using them-
selves as experimental subjects (Moult,
2007). In legal testimony, a witness’s own
first-hand observations are admissible evi-
dence, whereas second-hand hearsay is
not. In some social sciences, autoethno-
graphic approaches have yielded sig-
nificant new insights (Holyfield, 1999;
Buckley, 2012; HougeMackenzie and Kerr,
2013). I suggest that with appropriate pre-
cautions, analytical autoethnography can
also make unique contributions in psy-
chology. There is no reason to exclude
a valid and valuable source of data,
especially where it can reveal information
not otherwise available.
There is also a further possibility to
extend conventional ethnography into a
more experimental approach, using ana-
lytical autoethnography as a stepping
stone. There are some experiences which
research subjects in conventional ethno-
graphies are unable to describe, but which
suitably experienced analytical autoethno-
graphers can indeed describe and anal-
yse. Those single-subject analyses could
then be used as hypotheses against which
to test the recollections of ethnographic
subjects, through repeated interviews.
The prospective approach to analytical
autoethnography could also be extended
to conventional ethnography, by training
research subjects to observe their own
emotions during particular actions and
experiences.
Both these approaches would require
ethnographers to renegotiate their rela-
tionships with their research subjects. For
topics such as crime or espionage where
the researcher must remain disguised, this
may not be possible. For topics such as
extreme adventure sports, however, it is
entirely feasible. The first step, however,
is to recognize that through analytical
autoethnography, the direct experiences of
a researcher are not merely a tool in eluci-
dating the experiences of others, but valid
data in themselves.
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